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A Tale of Two Crises
By William K. Black, University of Texas at Austin, LBJ School of
Public
Affairs
Visiting Scholar, Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, Santa Clara
University

Academic Citation: William K. Black, “A Tale of Two Crises,”
Kravis Leadership Institute Leadership Review, Fall 2002.
About the Author: William K. Black, Ph.D., J.D., was a federal
regulator during the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980’s. He has
written and lectured extensively about criminal justice policy issues
such as white-collar crime, financial institutions, savings and loan
industry reform, public corruption, and public finance.

The savings and loan debacle of the 1980s was the worst financial
scandal in U.S. history. The estimated present value cost to the
taxpayers was $150-175 billion ($1993). The debacle was a major
contributor to a sharp recession in real estate values in the
Southwest. However, it had only a negligible effect on the general
economy.
The Japanese economy, the second largest in the world, also
experienced a crisis in the 1980s. Twin “bubbles” in its stock and
real estate markets hyper inflated for most of the decade of the
1980s. In general, the bigger the bubble, the worse the ultimate
effects on the general economy. When the bubbles burst in 1990
Japan was thrust into recession. Real estate values have continued to
fall – for twelve years! The stock market collapse was equally sharp.
The general economy has never recovered (though last quarter’s
revised GDP growth number may finally offer some faint hope).
One of the reasons the Japanese financial crisis proved so much
more severe than the contemporaneous U.S. savings and loan
debacle was the quality of leadership in the financial regulatory
ranks in the two countries. Japan never produced a regulator willing
to buck the powerful politicians and industry groups (banking, real
estate and construction) that gloried as the twin bubbles inflated to
obscene proportions and then, when they burst, covered up the
resultant Japanese financial crisis. In fact, Japanese bureaucrats have

endorsed and led the cover-up. As a result, its financial crisis
remains severe twelve years after the “twin bubbles” (real estate and
stock) burst.
Japan was filled with predictions in the 1980s that it would surpass
the U.S. economy shortly after the turn of the century. Japan’s
inability to deal with its financial crisis has shattered these
expectations and created a deep malaise. As I write, the “reform”
prime minister (of the unreformable Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP)) is introducing yet another “stimulus” package of
construction projects and naked government efforts to manipulate
the stock market. (Japan uses vast sums in its many “off book”
governmental entities to make coordinated stock purchases to inflate
share prices.) The construction projects have covered much of Japan
in concrete and nourished the LDP’s coffers through corrupt
kickbacks. (Bid rigging on government contracts is Japan’s
unofficial national sport. They have a word, “dango,” to describe the
bid rigging among construction firms.) The government
manipulation of the market helps explain why so few Japanese
invest in the stock market. Between the government rigging the
market and the traditional ethos of Japanese investment banking
firms (customers exist to be fleeced), relatively few Japanese risk
their savings to the mercies of the Japanese capital markets.
This explains why the Japanese postal system, which runs a vast
consumer banking system, is the largest depository institution in the
world. It doesn’t pay much in the way of interest (neither do the
banks), but your deposits don’t lose 60 percent of their value.
(Indeed, with deflation and yen appreciation, the return can be fairly
good.) The postal system, not coincidentally, is also a leading
source of LDP patronage jobs – with reciprocal contributions and
aid to the politicians that secure the appointments of the local
postmasters. The irony is that the postal deposit system, made
massive by investors shunning the stock markets, is one of the
largest providers of the funds used to manipulate the stock markets.
Of course, the more investors shun the stock market; the more it
falls. Even before the ongoing falls in U.S. and world share values,
Japan’s leading stock index, the NIKKEI, was only roughly 40
percent of its peak in the 1980s – and that loss of 60 percent
continued for a decade. The drop in value from the peak NIKKEI
average is now far worse. The LDP’s reaction to the drop in value is
to increase the manipulation of the market. It reminds me of a poster
one of my regulatory colleagues displayed: “The floggings will
continue until morale improves!” Japan continues to flog its

m
a
il
t
h
i
s
p
a
g
e

investing public and their morale continues to plummet.
A very large number of Japan’s financial experts earned advanced
degrees in the U.S. They know that these policies are
counterproductive and unworthy. They are contemptuous of the
pervasive and persistent failures of the LDP leadership. There are
copious academic articles opposing these policies; and some
supporting efforts by top employer trade associations.
What Japan has never had, however, is a senior financial regulator
who said “no” to the powerful. This may seem strange on one level,
for Japan’s financial regulators had high prestige and were
commonly brilliant. Until very recently, Japanese bureaucrats were
accorded a status and positive reputation that was the opposite of the
U.S. norm. The best and brightest graduates of Tokyo University’s
law program went into the civil service. Tokyo U. is the top school
in the country and is vastly more difficult to gain admission to than
any U.S. school. Senior bureaucrats ran the ministries; the Members
of the Diet who served as Cabinet Ministers were primarily
ornamentation. It seems that Japan’s senior financial regulators were
well positioned to provide superb leadership and take the painful,
but vital, steps to limit and then clean up the financial crises.
But this optimistic view ignores cultural and institutional differences
between the U.S. and Japan that make it all but inconceivable that a
regulator would stand up to the powerful and impose the necessary
painful remedies. Japan has a saying that “the nail that sticks up gets
hammered down.” (This is not Western chauvinism; Japanese
writers frequently cite this saying in explaining the nation’s
ineffective response to recent crises.)
There are many institutional differences between the U.S. and
Japan; I will focus on two. First, there was no real analog in Japan to
the U.S. concept of an independent regulatory agency. The Ministry
of Finance (MOF) was in charge of banking policy; it was intent on
taking credit for the economic “growth” of the 1980s. In the 1990s
its policy was to cover up the size of the catastrophe. All the largest
banks were probably seriously insolvent on a market value basis
because they invested so heavily in real estate and stock during the
twin bubbles. Second, the senior MOF bureaucrats traditionally
leave the government for a sinecure in the industry (where their
primary job is to maintain good contacts with their MOF
replacements). The poetic Japanese word for this practice is
translated into English as “descent from Heaven.” The U.S. has an
analogous concept (the “revolving door”), but the Japanese practice

is far stronger and more pervasive. Both of these institutional factors
reinforced the cultural pressure not to spurn the group consensus.
The current series of cover-ups by CEOs demonstrates that the
desire to hide embarrassing news is a human, not a governmental
trait. The many corporate officers who assisted abusive acts by their
superiors shows that the disinclination to take on the powerful is
also a common human trait.
But government officials are subject to unique temptation to cover
up scandals for a variety of reasons. The primary reason is that
neither they, nor society, consider their participation in a cover-up to
be unethical. In particular, when you have only a few billion in the
federal insurance fund to insure an industry that is, overall, insolvent
by $150 billion; it is easy to rationalize that you have to lie to the
public in order to prevent panic and a nationwide run on S&Ls in
the United States. No regulator wanted to go down in the history
books as the cause of the second Great Depression.
Government officials can also rationalize that the cover-up is a
matter of loyalty to the president or party. Danny Wall, the top S&L
regulator in 1987-89, explained that he hadn’t really deceived
Congress when he testified in 1988 that FSLIC did not need any
taxpayer funds because every member of Congress knew he was
speaking “in code.” He claims that they all knew he couldn’t tell the
truth until after the presidential elections in November and that
because they understood the “code” they weren’t being deceived.
Because they weren’t really deceived, he wasn’t really lying. Wall
should be an important cautionary parable for all of us interested in
ethical leadership. His parents raised him with high ethical precepts
and he believed that he embodied those virtues. Wall came very
close to becoming a pastor, carried a bible with him in his suit
pocket and believed he was hyper ethical.
But Wall did not become a pastor; he became a congressional aide.
Government accounting and budgeting is different from businesses
for some valid reasons, but many of the deviations from normal
principles exist for the express purpose of misleading the public for
political gain. Their peers and bosses do not shun the congressional
aides who commit these abuses. They are not defensive about their
actions. The pervasive attitude in Congress is that it is a game. The
best players at the game are praised and given more power. It is a
game played with equal relish by both parties. There are periodic
real efforts at reform. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
exists because the Members of Congress knew that, left to their own

devices, they were incapable of acting properly.
Government officials may also be more inclined to cover up
scandals because they have greater ability than CEOs to block
disclosure. They may classify the information, they may forbid
access to underlying documents that could expose the misconduct
on the grounds of executive privilege, and they may change the
governmental accounting rules.
One of the nice things about America is that these efforts often fail.
A great eye opener for me occurred when I presented a paper in
Switzerland. My colleague and I decided that since we were in the
land of bank secrecy we should meet with a Swiss white-collar
criminologist who was an expert on bank fraud to get the inside
scoop on Swiss banking abuses. The scholar we talked to was very
kind – between gales of laughter. He said: “You don’t understand.
This is Switzerland. It is illegal to disclose confidential information.
Those laws, the police enforce vigorously. The only way we Swiss
ever learn about Swiss banking abuses is when there is a
prosecution in the U.S. and the facts come out. I read U.S. papers
and go to the U.S. to learn about Swiss banks!”
The pervasive response to the S&L debacle was a cover-up. The
Administration wanted a cover-up. Ronald Reagan was elected on a
triple promise: he would cut taxes, increase defense spending and
balance the budget. His budget director, David Stockman, would
later admit that he knew the promises were incompatible and that he
deliberately distorted reports (i.e., he lied) to hide this fact. The
problem was that the S&L industry was federally insured and
insolvent by $150 billion. If the Administration admitted that the
deficit was really $150 billion greater than reported, it might not
have been able to get the 1981 tax cuts through Congress.
Congress also favored a cover-up. If it admitted the deficit was $150
billion greater it would have to cut deeply other programs dear to
constituents.
The S&L industry, represented by one of the three most powerful
trade associations in America, the League of Savings Institutions
(League) was all in favor of the cover-up. The federal and state S&L
regulators, with no money to spend to solve the problem, favored
the cover-up and perverted accounting rules to aid the deception.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board) Chairman Pratt,
President Reagan’s appointee to deal with the debacle, appeared to

be the right man, in the perfect place at the perfect time to deal with
the S&L crisis. He was an academic; a professor of finance, whose
area of expertise was the S&L industry. Pratt was the kind of leader
that is praised in all those leadership books you find in airport
bookstores. He came to a despondent agency. The Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) had only $6 billion in
reserves. The S&L industry, by mid-1982, was insolvent by $150
billion on a market value basis. The situation appeared hopeless.
Pratt roared into Washington, D.C. on his motorcycle, jumped off
and strode into the Bank Board in his cowboy boots. He instantly
energized the agency. Soon, the staff was working 12-14 hour days
six or seven days a week to arrange hundreds of “goodwill”
mergers. He drafted the key deregulation bill that became the
“Garn-St Germain Act of 1982” and he “desupervised” the industry
as well, cutting the number of examiners. He welcomed new
entrants to the industry, revising the rules to allow a single
individual to own 100 percent of the shares of an S&L. Hundreds of
real estate developers entered the industry in response to this
package of changes. By the end of 1993, the industry reported that it
had earned a (slim) profit. Pratt left to run a Merrill Lynch unit that
sold mortgage securities to the S&L industry.
But what Pratt had unintentionally done was create a perfect
environment for fraud by controlling persons (control fraud). And
the optimal control fraud was a “ponzi” scheme that required record
growth. By 1983, every control fraud was reporting record
(fictional) profits while becoming ever more deeply insolvent. The
average Texas control fraud was growing roughly 100 percent per
year. Overwhelmingly, they invested in the same thing – the
construction of new commercial office buildings. Soon, two things
were true in the major Texas cities – record vacancy rates and
surging property values. Those two things are not supposed to
happen at the same time. This was a sure sign of a real estate
bubble. At the rate the control frauds were growing, the bubble was
inflating at a frightening rate and threatening to take the entire
economy of the Southwest down with it when it burst. But Pratt was
oblivious to this.
Pratt’s leadership skills were exemplary in many ways. He was
extremely intelligent, creative, visionary, anti-bureaucratic,
charismatic, quick, hard working and had a wicked, self-deprecating
sense of humor.
Edward Gray became chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board when Pratt stepped down. Gray’s management deficiencies

were legendary. Meetings never began (remotely) on time. There
were no meaningful agendas once the meetings began. Gray would
abruptly leave meetings without explanation and might not return.
He and his chief of staff, Shannon Fairbanks, would fight like an old
married couple in front of the senior staff. Meetings took forever
and wandered aimlessly. Bank Board departments communicated
poorly or even worked at cross-purposes. There was no meaningful
strategic planning.
Ironically, given his background as a specialist is public relations,
Gray was an extremely poor spokesperson. Ever the journalist, he
insisted on composing his own speeches at the typewriter and
routinely stayed up until 4:00 a.m. to do so. The next day, looking
pale and haggard, he would deliver a long, rambling speech that
sounded to most listeners just like his last six speeches. He then sent
copies of these speeches to every S&L. None of this would have
gone over well in the best of circumstances. Following Pratt, a hero
to the staff, made Gray’s managerial deficiencies stark.
Within four months of becoming Chairman, however, Gray began to
change those policies. Gray began to understand that the industry
turn around to profitability was a fiction created by all the mergers
and Pratt’s Creative Regulatory Accounting Principles. In fact, the
industry was deeply insolvent and losing tens of billions of dollars a
year. He realized that the deregulation and desupervision of the
industry at a time of mass insolvency guaranteed disaster under
standard, conservative economic theory. He learned that the new
real estate developers who were both CEO and controlling
shareholder were primarily control frauds. The purported profits
were fictional.
Gray learned these things because he listened. Roughly 18 folks
reported directly to Gray and many others briefed him recurrently
on what was happening in the industry. It made for an untidy
organizational chart, but it meant that Gray heard many different
views.
LISTENING AND LEARNING
Gray not only listened; he changed his mind in light of the facts.
This proved to be one of his three great strengths as a leader. Pratt
felt he knew what the problems and solutions were. He directed the
staff. Gray began as Chairman sharing Pratt’s views; but he
modified them when he learned that they did not accord with reality.

But Gray’s change of policies made him anathema to almost
everyone powerful. He was saying that deregulation at a time of
mass insolvency and with federal deposit insurance was a disaster.
He was urging that deregulation required far more supervision, not
less. He was saying that the highest priority of the Administration,
Congress and the industry with regard to the debacle – covering up
the vast scope of the insolvency through abusive accounting – was
making the problem far worse. This was sure to enrage the
Administration. Gray was about to become the great “reregulator,”
and that was heresy.
Gray also enraged the industry. They opposed reregulation, they
opposed granting the supervisors any ability to use discretion and
judgment and they opposed providing any more money to the
deeply insolvent FSLIC.
Further, Gray faced the wrath of much of his own staff. Implicitly,
he was saying that all of those long nights and weekends they had
spent (at great personal and family cost) arranging the “goodwill”
mergers and deregulating the industry were worse than useless – all
their work had actually made things worse. Pratt had praised those
efforts and given them bonuses. Who was Gray, so clearly Pratt’s
intellectual inferior, to denigrate their efforts? And Gray was not
consistent. He fired a Bank Board economist for being one of the
authors of a paper (authorized by the agency’s chief economist) that
(accurately) said that the FSLIC did not have enough funds. That
action was indefensible and badly hurt Gray’s reputation. (Calmer
heads talked Gray out of going through with firing him.)
Gray faced great dissent among his colleagues. One Bank Board
Member sought to replace him as Chair. Gray had to weaken
seriously each of his proposed regulations in order to gain
(reluctant) support from his two colleagues.
THE“VISION THING”
Gray’s second great strength as a leader was (eventually) identifying
the two key things that had to be done. Gray’s most bitter opponents
were the control frauds. Pilots have a saying: “speed is life.” Growth
is life for a ponzi scheme. Gray’s single most effective rule was one
restricting growth and increasing net worth requirements. That rule
drove a stake through every ponzi scheme and assured that they
would fail relatively soon instead of becoming vastly larger failures.
The other key was to dramatically increase the quality and quantity

of the staff. Taking on this battle made the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) an even more virulent foe of Gray. It was a
battle he won with persistence and creativity (for arcane reasons, he
was able to do an end run around OMB by using the Federal Home
Loan Banks). One of the keys was that Gray brought in extremely
senior regulators from federal banking agencies. He did not
surround himself with yes men and he personally recruited senior
staff of exceptional ability (e.g., Joe Selby in Dallas and Mike
Patriarca in San Francisco) who were used to regulating the nation’s
largest banks. Gray listened to and learned from these people and
the examiners they hired and supervised. OMB responded by trying
to kill Gray’s efforts at reregulation and making a criminal referral
to the Justice Department against Gray!
Together, the growth rules and the increase in the number and vigor
of the supervisors stopped the ponzis and burst the horrific Texas
real estate bubble. But bursting a large bubble, like lancing a boil,
causes immense pain. The root cause of the pain, of course, is the
infection, not the doctor’s lance. But the bacteria that cause the
infection are invisible while the doctor and the lance are all too
visible.
The simile is inexact. While the bacteria are invisible, a boil is not.
It is ugly, painful and clearly unnatural and undesirable. A “bubble”
is the opposite. It appears to be quite wonderful to the participants.
A bubble appears iridescent and wondrous to all that see it. Bubbles
are magical; they appear to defy the laws of gravity (and the dismal
constraints of economics). A bubble is a real estate boom or a record
bull market. Bubbles always produce euphoria and maximize
hedonism. A boom has a million friends. Those who point out that
the boom is really a dangerous bubble have no friends. Those
growing rich from a bubble sense its fragile, ethereal nature and fear
that any unkind word may cause it to burst. No one caught up in a
bubble wants it to end.
Adults are able to figure out that the doctor who lances a boil is not
to blame. The pain is necessary to their cure. Delay will make things
worse for them. (Even with this knowledge we often delay painful
treatments.) Bursting a financial bubble helps society, but does not
help the participants. They get the pain, not the gain. When a
regulator causes immense pain to the powerful they do not thank
him. When a regulator takes aim with his lance at a financial bubble
he makes thousands of enemies and no friends.
The control frauds, which both caused and benefited from the

bubble, proved to be Gray’s most ruthlessly effective opponents.
They marshaled all of Gray’s other opponents into a coherent force
to stop reregulation. Charles Keating, the worst of the control
frauds, illustrates their power. Keating first tried to block
reregulation by hiring Alan Greenspan as his economic consultant to
attack the rules. He then got a majority of the House of
Representatives to co-sponsor a resolution calling on Gray not to
adopt a key rule. Gray went ahead anyway. Keating then hired the
most famous civil litigator in America, Arthur Liman, to threaten to
sue the Bank Board if it did not withdraw the rule. Gray refused.
Keating tried, but failed, to hire Gray – offering to quadruple his
salary.
The control frauds then tried to destroy Gray’s reputation in the
press. Gray’s conduct gave them some useful ammunition. Gray
was an odd combination of mildly venal and selfless. He lived in a
Spartan apartment, with no car, on cheap frozen foods. He sent the
great bulk of his salary to California where his wife and kids lived
(she hated Washington, D.C. and would not live there). He left
government service much poorer than when he entered – he had to
borrow money from his mother. But Gray also headed a weird
agency in which the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) were
agents of the federal government but not government agencies.
They were not subject to things like federal pay caps and they were
financially strong. The FHLBs had long provided accommodations
for Bank Board members when they traveled to monthly meetings
with the FHLBs and the Bank Board General Counsel had opined
this was legal. Gray’s three problems were that the FHLBs gave him
great accommodations (e.g., $500/night suites in the WaldorfAstoria), he clearly liked it that way, and he traveled far more than
his predecessors. Whether or not it was legal, it was wrong and it
made Gray look bad. Gray’s reputation took a serious hit. He was
pilloried in the press as a fool. Though a high school valedictorian
and college graduate, he was called “Mr. Ed” in print (after the TV
show about the talking horse!).
Keating decided to try to get Gray fired. He hired a top lobbyist who
reported the reasons this effort failed in an August 28, 1985 letter.
The Republican lobbyist reported that while most top
Administration officials wanted Gray gone, he enjoyed the loyalty
of Nancy and Ronald Reagan, and: “like so many before him in this
Administration, would have to be criminally liable or worse before
they would be removed.”
Don Regan, by now the President’s Chief of Staff, then tried to

force Gray to resign by leaking stories that the Administration
wanted him to leave and that he would soon resign. Gray refused to
leave.
Keating’s Texas counterparts were equally busy attacking Gray.
They used their extraordinary influence over Speaker Wright and
the Bank Board’s vulnerability to congressional extortion based on
holding hostage the proposed legislation to “recapitalize” FSLIC
(albeit with no taxpayer money). Passage of that bill was the Bank
Board’s transcendent priority in 1986 and 1987, so Gray gave in at
first to Jim Wright’s efforts. Ultimately, however, he decided that
Wright simply increased his extortionate demands and that Gray’s
duty as Bank Board Chairman was to take on the Speaker and
expose his conduct.
DUTY
It is this sense of duty that was Gray’s third great strength as a
leader. Some people get into conflicts because they are aggressive
by nature, others because they are stubborn, and some because they
are prideful and prickly. Gray was none of those things. He did not
want to be in a conflict with the powerful. The strain of doing so
took a dreadful toll on him. His hands shook, he aged terribly. And
most of all, he knew he would lose and he knew his career and
reputation would be broken. Most painful of all, he knew his friend
Ronald Reagan, a man he loved, would not come to his aid. But he
persisted. He thought very seriously about resigning, but decided it
would be a dereliction of duty.
And what of Shannon Fairbanks, his managerially challenged chief
of staff? She had a brain tumor removed and came back to the office
three weeks later, the wounds still open, because she felt that was
her duty. There is far more to leadership than management.
Improbably, the nation was well served by the (apologies to Chris
Berman) “stumbling, bumbling, rumbling” Gray Bank Board that
did “go – all – the – way.”
Ed Gray took on, simultaneously, much of the Administration,
Speaker Wright, the Keating Five (the five U.S. Senators recruited
by Keating to pressure Gray for favors), the League, his fellow
Bank Board members, a number of the key staff and most of the
press. He “lost” in most conventional senses. In a last, personally
painful betrayal, Treasury Secretary Baker met secretly with
Speaker Wright. They made a deal. Gray would not be reappointed
Chairman, Wright would support the $15 billion FSLIC

Recapitalization, and the Administration would permit the
“forbearance” provisions drafted by the control frauds to gut Gray’s
reregulation. Wright spoke in favor of the bill as promised, but his
“whip,” Tony Coelho, told the House Democrats that it was just for
show and they should vote instead for a $5 billion bill. In the end,
none of it mattered, for the League showed its lobbying power. In
May 1987, a majority of House Republicans, including Trent Lott
and Newt Gingrich, voted against the Administration! Democrats
voted more than 2-1 in favor of the S&Ls. Some called it the May
massacre.
But the nation ultimately won. Even though Gray’s successor,
Danny Wall, detested Gray and Gray’s policies he failed to
understand that the control frauds were frauds. He thought they
were misunderstood entrepreneurs. As a result, he did not
understand that his efforts to avoid closing them were doomed to
failure because the growth rule was fatal to all ponzis. Wall
succeeded in firing Selby. He removed Patriarca’s jurisdiction over
Lincoln Savings (after Keating showed that he had the support of
both the Keating Five and Speaker Wright). But Gray had hired so
many vigorous supervisors that all this did was destroy Wall’s
reputation and lead to his resignation in disgrace.
In the end, Gray proved the wisdom of William of Orange’s motto
about leadership in desperate circumstances. William led the fight
for independence by the Netherlands and Belgium from what was
then the most powerful nation on earth, Spain. He said: “It is not
necessary to hope in order to persevere.” Even though Gray’s fears
as to the personal cost that he would bear proved accurate, he
remains glad that he too persevered. Japan’s banking regulators
placated the powerful and avoided personal ruin, but I cannot
believe that they find looking in the mirror comfortable. Japan
needed its own Ed Gray during the 1980s to lance the bubbles. It
still needs an Ed Gray to end the cover-up. Indeed, the senior
financial regulator was so dedicated to covering up the scope of the
banking crisis that he refused to implement the prime minister’s
reform policies. He was finally fired in late September 2002 after
refusing for years to clean up the banking crisis.
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